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Abstract
There has been signicant recent interest in studying consumer behavior in sponsored search
advertising (SSA). Researchers have typically used daily data from search engines containing
measures such as average bid, average ad position, total impressions, clicks and cost for each
keyword in the advertiser's campaign. A variety of random utility models have been estimated
using such data and the results have helped researchers explore the factors that drive consumer
click and conversion propensities. However, virtually every analysis of this kind has ignored
the intra-day variation in ad position. We show that estimating random utility models on ag-
gregated (daily) data without accounting for this variation will lead to systematically biased
estimates { specically, the impact of ad position on click-through rate (CTR) is attenuated
and the predicted CTR is higher than the actual CTR. We demonstrate the existence of the
bias analytically and show the eect of the bias on the equilibrium of the SSA auction. Using
a large dataset from a major search engine, we measure the magnitude of bias and quantify
the losses suered by the search engine and an advertiser using aggregate data. The search
engine revenue loss can be as high as 11% due to aggregation bias. We also present a few data
summarization techniques that can be used by search engines to reduce or eliminate the bias.
Key words: Sponsored search, generalized second-price auctions, consumer choice models, Hi-
erarchical Bayesian estimation, latent instrumental variables, aggregation bias.
1 Introduction
Sponsored search advertising (SSA) has not only transformed the way companies conduct their
marketing activities, but it has also been a tremendous resource to academic researchers who seek
to better understand how consumers respond to such ads. A myriad of researchers have turned to
SSA data to uncover new insights about consumer search (Ghose and Yang, 2009; Rutz and Bucklin,
2011), choice and related purchasing behaviors (Jeziorski and Segal, 2009; Yang and Ghose, 2010;
Agarwal et al., 2011) and advertiser/search engine strategies (Animesh et al., 2009; Yao and Mela,
2011; Rutz et al., 2012). Many of these papers have used random utility models to study the eect
of ad position, keyword length, presence or absence of brand name, etc. on the click-through and
conversion rates of the ads.
Sponsored search refer to ads that are displayed alongside organic search results when a user
issues a query at a search engine. The advertisers submit bids for keywords that are relevant to
them, along with these ads.1 When a user enters a query, the search engine identies the advertisers
bidding on keywords closely related to the query and uses data on bids and ad quality/performance
to rank order the ads in a list of sponsored results. The most widely used pricing model is the
pay-per-click model, in which the advertiser pays only when a user clicks on his ad. The advertiser's
cost per click or CPC is determined using a generalized second price auction (GSP), i.e. whenever
a user clicks on an ad at a particular position, the advertiser pays an amount equal to the minimum
bid needed to secure that position.
Although SSA is a relatively new practice, it already has fairly well-established data standards
associated with it. Most researchers who have modeled SSA-related issues have worked with a
data structure such as the one illustrated in Table 1. Advertisers also obtain similar datasets from
search engines and analyze them to design their bidding policies. In almost all cases, these data
are aggregated to the daily level and contain summary statistics for the day, such as the number
of ad impressions, average position of the ad, number of clicks received and the average CPC. It
should be clear how this kind of dataset lends itself to the types of models mentioned above, as
well as analysis of a variety of other customer behaviors (and related rm actions). But despite
the creativity and methodological prowess that has been demonstrated in this growing body of
1The term keyword refers to term or phrase on which an advertiser bids. Query (or query term) is the search
phrase entered by the consumer when conducting the search
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Table 1. Sample dataset for a particular keyword
date impressions clicks avg. pos avg. bid avg. CPC
01/11/09 180 1 19.33 1.00 0.30
01/12/09 202 0 18.42 1.00 0.00
01/13/09 223 5 8.19 2.00 1.24
01/14/09 198 3 7.94 2.00 0.89
01/15/09 197 5 8.08 2.00 1.21
01/16/09 321 21 2.00 3.00 2.12
literature, we believe that these modeling eorts are plagued by a major problem: an aggregation
bias due to the way that the raw (search-by-search) data are \rolled" up into Table 1.
In practice, the position of an ad can vary substantially within a day and aggregated data fail
to capture this variation. It is also widely known that the impact of position on CTR is non-linear.
For example, an ad at the topmost position tends to receive a disproportionately large number of
clicks as compared to ads on other positions. The convexity in the CTR, coupled with the intra-day
variation in position suggests that the daily aggregation might lead to estimation bias. The goal of
this paper is to provide a thorough evaluation of the nature of this bias, to demonstrate its eects
and provide recommendations to eliminate the bias.
The paper makes the following contributions. Firstly, we show that applying a logistic model
to aggregated SSA data can lead to biased estimation of the parameters of a random utility model.
Due to the bias, the eect of position on CTR is attenuated and the predicted CTR is higher than
the actual CTR. Surprisingly, we nd that if all the advertisers use aggregate data, the consequence
of the bias is entirely borne by the search engine. Secondly, we quantify the magnitude of the bias
and measure its economic impact. While some researchers studying the use of aggregated consumer
data in other marketing settings suggest that aggregation bias is not important (Gupta et al., 1996;
Russell and Kamakura, 1994), others emphasize the need to address aggregation bias explicitly
(Narayanan and Nair, 2012; Neslin and Shoemaker, 1989). Using a unique and large disaggregate
dataset from a major search engine, we show that aggregation bias is very signicant in this context.
We nd that the search engine losses can be as high as 11% on average due to aggregation bias.
Our ndings raise serious concerns for SSA researchers and practitioners and also question the
adequacy of the data standards that have become common in SSA. Finally, we present alternative
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data summarization techniques and modeling approaches that can reduce or eliminate the bias. We
nd that sharing harmonic means instead of arithmetic means or complementing arithmetic means
by other summary information such as the variance can help reduce the bias signicantly. These
results are robust in our analysis of a large real-world dataset as well as simulations that attempt
to vary several aspects of the sponsored search market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related work and positions
our work in the literature. In Section 3, we analytically prove the existence of the bias and build
a game-theoretic model to study the economic impact of the bias. In Section 4, we analyze a large
disaggregate dataset from a search engine using the HB-LIV model. We present the managerial
implications of the bias in Section 5. In Section 6, we present some cures for the problem of
aggregation { data summarization techniques and modeling approaches that can reduce the bias.
Finally, we discuss the implications of the bias on research and practice and conclude the study in
Section 7.
2 Related work
There has been a considerable amount of work on auction design and consumer choice models in
SSA (Weber and Zheng, 2007; Liu et al., 2007; Hao et al., 2009; Goldfarb and Tucker, 2007). More
specically, there are two streams of work that are closely related to our study, namely empirical
research on consumer click and conversion behavior in SSA and work related to aggregation biases
in choice models.
Empirical Research in Sponsored Search
There has been a lot of recent interest in trying to understand the factors driving keyword perfor-
mance in SSA. Craswell et al. (2008) and Ali and Scarr (2007) propose individual keyword-level
models to study how consumers navigate sponsored links. Other researchers have used logit models
to measure the inuence of factors like ad position and keyword characteristics on consumer behav-
ior in SSA (Rutz et al., 2012; Rutz and Bucklin, 2011; Ghose and Yang, 2009; Agarwal et al., 2011).
Rutz et al. (2012) compare the performance of several logit models in predicting the conversions for
various keywords. Their results show that keywords are heterogeneous in their conversion rate and
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a signicant portion of this variation can be explained by the presence of brand or geographical
information in the keyword. In another paper, Rutz and Bucklin (2011) measure the spill-over
eect of generic keywords on branded keywords. Ghose and Yang (2009) use a random eect logit
model to understand the relationship between dierent metrics such as CTR, conversion rates, bid
prices and ad position using the advertiser's aggregate data. They show that keywords containing
retailer information have a higher CTR whereas keywords that are more specic or contain brand
information have a lower CTR. Recent work by Agarwal et al. (2011) uses a logit model to show
that although the CTR decreases with position, the conversion rate is non-monotonic in position.
They point out that the topmost position is not necessarily the revenue maximizing position.
Most of this stream of research uses aggregate data to estimate the parameters of the model.
The aggregate data obfuscate the variation in ad position and research in this area has overlooked
this fact. Ignoring this variation can lead to potential biases in the estimation of parameters and
ultimately aect the conclusions from these studies.
Aggregation Bias
Though researchers have grappled with the issue of data aggregation for many years, there is no
clear consensus on this issue. The problems associated with aggregation have been commonly
encountered in spatial and demographic studies and are referred to as the Yule-Simpson eect
(Good and Mittal, 1987). The drawbacks of aggregation have also been pointed out in various
studies in the economics and marketing literature. Neslin and Shoemaker (1989) point out the
limitations of aggregate data by refuting the claim that sales promotions undermine the consumer's
repeat-purchase propensity. They show that even if the individual purchase propensities do not
change before and after promotions, statistical aggregation would lead to lower average repeat
probabilities for post promotional purchases. Yatchew and Griliches (1985) discuss the implications
of aggregation in the context of probit models. Issues related to data aggregation in the case of
logit models have been presented by Kelejian (1995). He discusses why aggregation bias might
occur when logit models are estimated on aggregate data and proposes a test for the existence of
this bias.
On the other hand, several researchers believe that the eect of aggregation is negligible or
absent when the disaggregate model can be approximated by the aggregate model (Gupta et al.,
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1996; Russell and Kamakura, 1994). Using household-level panel data and store-level purchase data,
Gupta et al. (1996) show that the price elasticity estimated from the two models dier by a very
small amount (4.7%). Allenby and Rossi (1991) present an analytical proof for the non-existence of
aggregation bias in nested logit models of consumer choice when the products are close substitutes
of each other, though they assume that the micro-level consumer behavior is approximately linear
in the product attributes. More specically, in the context of sponsored search, Rutz and Trusov
(2011) use a latent instrumental variable approach that addresses endogeneity in search auctions.
Their model has an added benet that it addresses some aspects of aggregation bias, such as that
due to aggregation of daata from heterogeneous consumers with dierent preferences and that due
to strategic bidding. However, as we show later in Section 5, the approach does not fully address
aggregation the bias resulting from aggregated ad performance data when ads are shown in multiple
positions.
The discussion reveals two themes. First, a number of recent studies have applied the logit model
on aggregated SSA data to study consumer choice behavior. Second, although aggregation bias has
been shown to exist in a number of environments, its non-existence has also been demonstrated in
several other environments. It is not clear which of these arguments is most applicable in the SSA
context, and it is thus not clear whether and to what extent aggregation bias aects SSA research.
This paper uses a theoretical model to show why data aggregation might lead to biased estimates
in the SSA context and how this bias aects the outcome in a search engine auction. An extensive
disaggregate search engine dataset is used to empirically measure the extent of aggregation bias in
SSA research, which we believe has been done for the rst time. Finally, we suggest ways in which
the bias can be reduced or eliminated.
3 Aggregation Bias
In this section, we explore the estimation bias due to the aggregation of SSA data. We begin by
pointing out the distinction between the complete (disaggregate) and the summary (aggregate)
data that have been referred to in the paper. Table 2 is a stylized example that presents impression
level data for an ad, reecting every search query for a particular term. Each observation contains
the date on which the impression occurred, position of the ad, bid placed by the advertiser, whether
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the consumer clicked on the ad and nally the CPC. Search engines usually do not provide such
granular data to advertisers or researchers. They provide aggregated data at the daily level as
shown earlier in Table 1 that mask the intra-day variation in position. Discussions with several
search engines reveal that they do not provide impression level data because it is expensive for
advertisers to store, manage and analyze such huge amounts of data. In addition, concerns about
user privacy and click-fraud further reduce the incentive to provide disaggregate data.
The intra-day variation arises due to two major factors { Firstly, SSA auctions are extremely
dynamic with advertisers entering and exiting the auction or changing their bids continuously.
Changes in competitors' behavior lead to changes in the ad position. Secondly, most of the ads,
specically broad match and phrase match ads are shown for a number of dierent queries.2 As
the set of competitors can be dierent for dierent queries, the position of the ad also varies across
queries.
Table 2. Complete dataset for a particular keyword
impression date click pos bid CPC
1 01/11/09 0 16 1 0.00
2 01/11/09 0 20 1 0.00
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8190 02/15/09 0 6 2 0.00
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9145 02/23/09 1 1 3 2.31
3.1 Analytical Proof of Aggregation Bias
Logit utility model
The logit utility model has been extensively used in economics and marketing to explain consumer
choice behavior. Researchers have primarily focused on keyword-level models to analyze the eect
that factors like ad position, specicity of the keyword and presence of brand name have on the
2An exact match occurs when the user's query term exactly matches the advertiser's keyword. A phrase match
occurs when the advertisers keyword appears anywhere within the user's query. Finally, a broad match occurs when
user query is determined to be broadly similar to advertiser's keyword. Broad match is commonly used by advertisers
as it maximizes the number of ad impressions.
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consumer's propensity to click on the ad. The consumer's utility has been modeled as
U = X 0 + ; (1)
where X is a vector of covariates,  is the consumer's sensitivity to these attributes and  
Logistic(0; 1). In binary choice models, this utility is not observed but constitutes a latent variable.
The consumer clicks on an ad when U > 0. Variable Y 2 f0; 1g denotes whether a click was made
or not. In conjugation with prior research, we build a keyword-level model that ignores other ad
characteristics and focuses our attention on the impact of ad position on click through rate, i.e.
CTR = f(position)0. The simple model allows us to clearly identify the existence and direction of
the bias. However, this assumption does not impose any restrictions on the model as all keyword
characteristics (which typically do not change during the day) are subsumed in the intercept term
and the we focus our attention on position which varies intra-day. Although we focus on a keyword-
level model in this paper, our nding are applicable for dierent levels of analysis.
Estimation using complete dataset
We now discuss the estimation of  when the model is estimated using the complete dataset. Let
Vi be a random variable denoting the ad position on the i
th impression. We assume that Vi is
independent and identically distributed and has a cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) given
by FV (:), which is assumed to be constant during the period of observation.
3 The consumer's utility
is given by the following expression
Ui = 0 + 1Vi + i: (2)
As i is extreme value distributed, the probability of clicking on an ad (CTR) is pi = 1=(1 +
exp f0 + 1vig). Note that pi might vary across impressions due to variation in the ad position.
Let ^c denote the maximum likelihood estimate from the complete dataset. It can be easily shown
that ^c is a consistent and unbiased estimator of  (Hayashi, 2000, Proposition 7.6).
3Let V = E[V ] and 2V = V ar(V ).
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Estimation using aggregate dataset
Researchers do not observe Vi when aggregate data are used. They only observe the mean daily
position W which is given by
W =
V1 + V2 + : : :+ VN
N
; (3)
where N is the random number of ad impressions on a particular day and V1; : : : ; VN is the ad
position during each of those impressions. The distribution of W is FW (:) and it depends on the
distribution of V and N . If the eect of position is estimated from aggregate data, the consumer
utility from clicking the ad is eectively modeled as
Ud = 0 + 1Wd + d; (4)
where Wd is the average position for the day and d is the logistically distributed error term. This
formulation causes a mis-specication as the consumers do not observe the ad at a position Wd
but at position V . As the variable Z = V  Wd (E[ZjW ] = 0), which aects the consumer's click
behavior, is not accounted for in the regression, the mis-specication is similar to omitted variables
bias pointed out by Yatchew and Griliches (1985) and Wooldridge (2001). However, this issue arises
primarily due to data aggregation and our approach is closely related to prior work in Marketing
by Christen et al. (1997), Steenkamp et al. (2005) and Gupta et al. (1996). Further, as V ar(Z)
is not constant (it depends on the number of impressions in a days), the ndings of Yatchew and
Griliches (1985) and Wooldridge (2001) are not directly applicable in this context. Hence, we derive
an important relationship between W and V in order to prove the aggregation bias.
Lemma 1 W cx V , i.e. W is less than V in convex order. 4 ,
This relationship between W and V is very general and holds for any distribution, FV (:). Using
Lemma 1, we prove an important result of this paper.
Proposition 1 ^s is a biased estimator of .
4X is less than Y in convex order if E[f(X)]  E[f(Y )] for all real convex functions f such that the expectation
exists. All proofs appear in the appendix.
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If ^c is equal to ^s then the convex order between W and V implies that
E
"
expf^0;c + ^1;cV g
1 + expf^0;c + ^1;cV g
#
> E
"
expf^0;s + ^1;sWg
1 + expf^0;s + ^1;sWg
#
:
Since both the L.H.S. and the R.H.S. equal the overall CTR during the observation period (as
shown in the appendix), this inequality is incorrect and hence ^c cannot equal ^s. Since ^c is a
consistent and unbiased estimator of , ^s is biased. This nding is contrary to earlier work by
Allenby and Rossi (1991), Gupta et al. (1996) and Russell and Kamakura (1994), which prove that
aggregation bias in market or store-level scanner data is negligible. Aggregation bias is signicantly
reduced in their context as products are very close substitutes of each other and the consumers (or
house-holds) are exposed to very similar marketing activities. However, position has a very strong
eect in sponsored search (Craswell et al., 2008) and ads in dierent positions may be perceived
very dierently by consumers. Coupled with variation in ad position, aggregation bias can be quite
substantial, which is formalized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The direction of aggregation bias is such that (i) the CTR estimated from the
summary data is greater than or equal to the actual CTR at any position, (ii) ^1;s > ^1;c, and
under certain conditions, (iii) ^1;s
p! 1=
q
21

2V + (3
2
V + 
2
V )
	
+ 1, where  = E[1=N ].5
^s is biased and it predicts a CTR that is higher than the actual CTR at any position. Incorrect
estimation of CTR might lead advertisers to make suboptimal choices in sponsored search auc-
tions. The second part of Proposition 2 is consistent with Wooldridge (2001) which shows that the
estimates are scaled towards zero. Furthermore, the omitted variable Z increases the disturbance
term in the regression. The estimated error can be computed as a convolution of  and Z, but this
is analytically intractable as  is logistically distributed. However, Proposition 2(iii) holds when
1Z +  can be approximated closely by a logistic distribution. Proposition 2 shows that, if the
variation in the intra-day position is known, the actual 1 can be approximated by multiplying ^1;s
by the scaling factor. However, this approach suers from several simplifying assumptions that
are required for analytical tractability. We provide more general and robust empirical methods to
remove the bias in Section 5. Although we prove that the bias exists for a logistic model, it is
5The expectation of the inverse of the number of daily impression, E[1=N ], is bounded by (1   (1   e ))= 
  (1  [1  F(1) + 3(1  F(2))=m]) where  = E[N ] and F(:) is the CDF of N . When there are a large number
of daily impressions, i.e. !1, ! 1.
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easy to show that these results would be applicable in any binary choice model where the choice
behavior is convex in position.
3.2 Eect on Equilibrium Behavior
As advertisers use estimates from historical data to bid in SSA auctions, incorrect estimation of the
CTR might have a negative impact on their revenues. In this section, we build a game-theoretic
model to analyze the impact of aggregation on the advertisers' and search engine's revenues.
For our analysis, we make the following assumptions { (i) there areK advertising slots andK+1
advertisers, (ii) the advertisers' valuation for a click, sk are drawn from a continuous distribution
with support on [0;1), (iii) advertisers know their own valuation and the distribution of competing
bids and nally, (iv) the click-through rate, i, decreases with the position i. In addition, we also
assume that advertisers estimate i from historical data and are unaware of the aggregation bias.
The advertisers are indexed in decreasing order of their valuations, i.e. s1 > s2 > : : : sK+1 and
their bids are b1; : : : ; bK+1, respectively.
6 In addition, let h = (bi; : : : ; bK+1) refers to the history
of bids prior to assignment of position i.7 The case where complete data are used is analyzed
rst. Here the advertisers correctly estimate i. Edelman et al. (2007) show that under the above
assumptions, there exists a unique envy-free perfect Bayesian equilibrium and the optimal strategy
for advertiser k under this equilibrium is to bid as follows,
bk(sk; i; h) = sk   i
i 1
(sk   bi+1): (5)
This is the maximum CPC that the advertiser is willing to pay to move to position i 1 and receive
more clicks. At this point, Advertiser k is indierent between getting position i   1 at a CPC of
bk(sk; i; h) and position i at bi+1. This is an ex-post equilibrium, i.e., it is optimal for Advertiser k
to follow the equilibrium strategy for any realization of other advertisers' valuations. The search-
engine revenue is CS =
PK
i=1 ibi+1 and the payos for advertiser i is 
C
i = i(si bi+1). It should
be noted that this equilibrium ensures an assortive match, i.e., if si > sj then advertiser i bids
higher than advertiser j and occupies a slot above advertiser j in equilibrium. This case serves as
a reference for the ensuing discussion.
6bK+1 is set to 0.
7Positions K through i+ 1 are assignment before bidding for position i starts.
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Next, we consider the case in which aggregate data are used. Let the CTR estimated from
aggregate data be denoted as 
0
i.
Remark 1 When aggregate data are used to estimate CTR, the ratio i=i 1 is overestimated due
to the presence of aggregation bias.8
Due to this overestimation, advertisers might bid incorrectly. As the equilibrium considered here
is ex-post, the advertisers' bidding strategies depend neither on their beliefs about each others
valuations nor on the fact that some advertisers might be using aggregate data. The bidding
strategies continue to be similar to the one outlined in Equation (5), but the bids in this case,
b
0
1; : : : ; b
0
K , might be dierent.
9 We consider two extreme cases to study the impact of aggregation
bias { (i) all advertisers except one use complete data and, (ii) all advertisers use aggregate data.
Let the search-engine revenue in Case I(II) be denoted by 
AI(II)
S and advertisers' prot by 
AI(II)
i .
Case I: Suppose advertisers other than Advertiser j have access to complete data and can compute
i correctly. Only Advertiser j uses aggregate data and overestimates 1. This leads him to
overestimate the ratio i=i 1 and he bids in the following manner.
b
0
j(sj ; i; h) = sj  

0
i

0
i 1
(sj   b0i+1): (6)
As Advertiser j bids lower in equilibrium, he occupies a position j
0  j. The following proposition
characterizes the equilibrium in this case (detailed analysis and proofs are provided in the appendix).
Proposition 3 (i) If only Advertiser j uses aggregate data, the top advertisers (i  j) bid lower,
advertisers in between (j < i  j0) bid higher and the remaining advertisers (i > j0) bid the same
as they would have when everyone had complete data. (ii) The payos of the search engine and
Advertiser j decrease (AIS < 
C
S ;
AI
j < 
C
j ) while all other advertisers receive payos that are
either the same or higher than payos they would have received if all advertisers were using complete
data (AIi  Ci ; i 6= j).
8Writing the CTR in terms of the logit model we get, i
i 1 =
expf0+1ig
1+expf0+1ig 
1+expf0+1(i 1)g
expf0+1(i 1)g  expf1g when
CTRs are small. Since ^1;s > ^1;c ) i=i 1 < 0i=
0
i 1.
9We continue to assume that Advertiser K + 1 still bids 0.
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Advertiser j underestimates the impact of position and incorrectly bids less, which might move
him to a lower position. In turn, some advertisers who were below him move up one position.
The ordering of these advertisers does not change, which is a consequence of the bidding policy
(Edelman et al., 2007). As b
0
j < bj0 , bids required to acquire all positions above j
0
decrease. As
bids for all position are (weakly) lower, the search engine loses revenue. Clearly, Advertiser j's
payo is lower, because he deviates from the optimal policy. However, the loss in revenue for the
search engine is substantially higher than the loss in revenue for the advertiser using aggregate data.
Interestingly, all these losses are transferred to the other advertisers ( 6= j) as excess surplus since
GSP is a zero-sum game. Hence, the search engine suers the most due to aggregation bias and all
advertisers apart from j are better o due to aggregation. In the subsequent case, we observe that
the search engine internalizes all the negative impact of aggregation.
Case II: When all advertisers use aggregate data, their estimate of the CTR, 
0
i are greater than
the actual CTR as shown in Proposition 3. For simplicity, we assume that all advertisers arrive at
the same estimates for 
0
i.
10 As a result, Advertiser k adopts the following bidding strategy,
b
0
k(sj ; i; h) = sk  

0
i

0
i 1
(sk   b0i+1):
It is easy to see that the bid placed by advertiser K (the last advertiser) is less than the bid he
would have placed had he estimated CTR from complete data. Proceeding in an iterative fashion
we can show that all advertisers place a lower bid. The equilibrium in this case is specied in the
following proposition.
Proposition 4 (i) When all advertisers use aggregate data, the advertisers are arranged in as-
sortive order. The resulting bids are lower than the bids when complete data are used (b
0
i < bi; i =
1; : : : ;K). (ii) Search-engine revenue is lower (A2S < 
C
S ) and advertisers' payo are higher
(A2i > 
C
i ) as compared to the complete case.
In the appendix, we show that the advertisers bid less than what they would have had they
known the actual CTR. As all the advertisers use the same incorrect estimate of the CTR, the
10This result continues to hold even if the advertisers arrive as dierent estimates of 
0
i as long as i=i 1 <

0
i=
0
i 1, which always hold true due to aggregation bias as shown earlier.
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eventual ranking remains the same as in the complete case. They receive the same number of clicks
but at a lower CPC and hence their payos are higher. Surprisingly, the search-engine revenue
suers the most when all advertisers use aggregate data even though the advertisers make the
wrong decisions. These results question the data standards that have become common in SSA
and underscore the need to provide better data to advertisers. We also show that it is incentive
compatible for the search engine to provide richer/better data to advertisers.
Note that an advertiser always receives a higher payo when he uses complete data as compared
to aggregate data, irrespective of the fraction of advertisers using aggregate data. This intuition is
formalized in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 An advertiser can always increase his payo from SSA by unilaterally using com-
plete data instead of aggregate data.
The dierence in payo between the two cases (complete v/s aggregate) can be considered as
the value of complete data or alternately the disutility from aggregate data. Although advertis-
ers cannot get impression level data, they can periodically crawl the search engine and estimate
the empirical distribution of the ad position. Moreover, with recent improvements in ad tagging
and user tracking techniques, advertisers might be able to collect impression level data for a few
customers.
4 Empirical Analysis
In the previous section, we analytically show that aggregation at a daily level leads to a bias.
However, as pointed earlier, several papers show that aggregation bias is negligible in various
marketing data (Allenby and Rossi, 1991; Gupta et al., 1996; Russell and Kamakura, 1994). They
argue that aggregation bias is signicantly reduced because the products considered in their analysis
are very close substitutes. These ndings might not hold in SSA as Craswell et al. (2008), Ghose
and Yang (2009) and Abhishek and Hosanagar (2013) show that ad position has a very strong eect
in SSA. We perform the following empirical analysis on large representative search engine data to
examine and conclusively prove that ad position has a strong inuence on consumer click behavior,
which leads to signicant aggregation bias. Furthermore, we want to measure the extent of the
bias and observe its economical signicance.
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4.1 Data Description
We analyze a large disaggregate data from a major search engine, which is extremely representa-
tive of consumer behavior in SSA. The data contain around 8 million unique impressions chosen
randomly from all user queries between August 10, 2007 and September 25, 2007. These are very
unique data as search engines rarely provide impression level data to advertisers or researchers.
For every impression, the dataset contains the user query, ads shown on the page and number of
ads on the preceding pages. Each ad is identied by a unique ad identier, though the dataset
does not contain any ad-specic information. The dataset also contains information about clicks
during this period of observation. We construct an ad-level dataset, that contains information
about the keyword the advertiser was bidding on and all the impressions of the ad associated with
the keyword, which is similar to the one presented in Table 2.
Table 3. Summary Statistics
Total impressions 8,142,210
Unique queries 24,235
Unique ads 229,960
Ads with more than one impression 184,481
Mean impressions for every ad 64.4
Median impressions for every ad 7.0
There is evidence that there is substantial variation in position and reporting average position
alone results in the loss of information on actual position as shown in Figure 1. We next investigate
the impact of data aggregation.
Standard Deviation in Intra−Day Position( SD(V))
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Figure 1. Mean Intra-day Variation in Position.
The ad level data described earlier are summarized at a daily level to create aggregate data.
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The data thus generated are similar to the campaign summaries that search engines make available
to the advertisers (as presented in Table 1).
4.2 Hierarchical Bayesian Model
We estimate a random-eect logit model using Hierarchical Bayesian (HB) techniques that are
commonly used in SSA. As our data do not contain any ad-specic attributes, the only covariate
included in our models is position. The eect of ad characteristics is captured in the ad-specic
intercept term. We demonstrate the aggregation bias for HB model.
We extend the binary choice logit model proposed earlier in Section 3 to account for multiple
keywords. Under this specication, the consumer's utility from clicking on ad k during impression
i is given by
Uik = 0k + 1kVik + ik (7)
where ik is the idiosyncratic, logistically distributed error term. k = (0k; 1k)
0
are keyword
specic parameters which are assumed to be random and heterogeneous across ads. They drawn
from a multivariate normal distribution in the following manner:
k  N2(; V) where V =
0B@ 0 01
01 1
1CA :
Similar models have been extensively used in prior research in SSA (Ghose and Yang, 2009; Yang
and Ghose, 2010). Note that although this random coecient model captures heterogeneity across
ads, it still fails to accounts for the intra-day variation in Vik if the model is estimated on aggregate
data. As a result, we expect the aggregation bias to extend to the random-coecient model as
well. To test this hypothesis, we take a random sample of ads from our data and apply the model
in Equation (7) to both the disaggregate and aggregate datasets and compare the estimates.
The log-likelihood function for the complete data is as follows
LL(jcomplete data) /
KX
k=1
IKX
i=1
Yik log pik + (1  Yik) log(1  pik); (8)
where Yik is the indicator variable that denotes whether the i
th impression of keyword k received a
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click or not and pik, the click-through probability is given by
pik =
expf0k + 1kvikg
1 + expf0k + 1kvikg : (9)
The log-likelihood function for the aggregate data is as follows
LL(jaggregate data) /
KX
k=1
DX
d=1
cdk log pdk + (ndk   cdk) log(1  pdk); (10)
where ndk and cdk denote the number of impressions and clicks on day d respectively and pdk, the
click-through probability is given by
pdk =
expf0k + 1kwdkg
1 + expf0k + 1kwdkg : (11)
As the data on clicks are often sparse for most keywords in sponsored search, the SSA literature
primarily uses Hierarchical Bayesian models. We use a similar approach and assume that the mean
and variance-covariance matrix for k have the following priors
  N2(;); (12)
V  1  Wishart(;): (13)
The parameters ;; ;; and V
 1
 are estimated separately from the complete and the ag-
gregate datasets using a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) approach. Before discussing the
details of the MCMC estimation procedure, we discuss some identication issues associated with
the model presented here.
4.3 Identication
The ad position in the previous exposition has been assumed to be exogenous. However, the position
is decided by the bids placed by the advertiser. In addition, we know that past performance aects
the quality score of the ad which in turn aects the position. The auction process and historical
performance jointly determine the position which is one of the most important strategic variables
that advertisers focus on in SSA. This indicates that position is endogenous (i.e. E[postt] 6= 0)
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and the endogeneity should be explicitly incorporated in the HB model presented earlier.11
Endogeneity has been a major concern in the SSA literature and researchers have proposed
several techniques to address this issue. Ghose and Yang (2009) and Yang and Ghose (2010) use a
simultaneous equation model to address this problem. Their simultaneous model forms a triangular
system of equations which can be identied without any further identication constraints. Agarwal
et al. (2011) use a series of random bids to address the endogenous nature of position. In their
specication, position is completely determined by the random bids and quality score which are
exogenous. Recent econometric advances have lead to the development of the latent instrument
variable (LIV) framework (Ebbes et al., 2005), which has been used by Rutz and Trusov (2011)
and Rutz et al. (2012) to account for position endogeneity. The LIV framework uses a likelihood
based approach, which can be easily integrated with the HB model proposed earlier, and can be
estimated using the MCMC estimator.
In a LIV formulation, the endogenous covariate is decomposed into a stochastic term that is
uncorrelated with the error and another one that is possibly correlated with the error, i.e. X = +
where  is the uncorrelated part of X such that E[] = 0 and E[] = . As  varies in the
dataset, it is possible to identify the correlation between  and , denoted by . For the sake of
simplicity, we modify the model presented in Equation (7) such that, ik = ik + #ik, where ik is
correlated with ad position and #ik is orthogonal to position and logistically distributed. Clearly,
E[] = E[] = , which we denote by  for the sake of exposition. The LIV approach is
extended to binary choice models by introducing a latent categorical variable with M categories
(Rutz et al., 2012). Position can assume any of these M categorical values with a probability
 = f1; 2; : : : ; Mg,
PM
m=1. More specically,
postk = 
0
kt +Z
0
kt + kt; (14)
where   MultinomialM () is the stochastic part of poskt and is exogenous whereas kt is
11We thank the anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
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endogenous.12 The errors (kt; kt)
0 are MVN distributed in the following manner
0B@ tk
tk
1CA =MVN
264
0B@ 0
0
1CA ;
0B@ 2 2
2 
2

1CA
375 : (15)
Zkt represents the observed instruments, and in our analysis we use lagged position as IVs which is
similar to the approach adopted by Rutz et al. (2012). Similar to Rutz et al. (2012), we estimate the
parameters ; and V jointly for the entire observation period when the estimation is performed
on aggregate data. In the case of complete data, we exploit the richness of the data to estimate
the parameters, ; and V, on a daily basis. Such an approach can account for variations over
time, due to changes in advertisers' bids or other auction related factors, and might lead to better
performance. The exact dierence between estimation on the complete versus aggregate data is
explained in detail in the Online Appendix.
4.4 Estimation Results
We estimate both the HB model and HB model with LIV (HB-LIV) to draw comparisons between
the two methods. A sample size of 200 ads is chosen for estimating the parameters. We make
this choice primarily for computational convenience as estimating the model on disaggregate data
takes a long time. The disaggregate dataset contains a large number of observations, hence the
estimation on the disaggregate dataset is really slow.13
We start o with diused priors ( = 0; = 100I;  = 5; = I) and rene them as the esti-
mation proceeds. The exact estimation procedure is outlined in the Online Appendix. We run the
MCMC simulation for 100,000 draws and the rst 50,000 sample are discarded. The MCMC chains
are stationary after the burn-in period. The MCMC chains are thinned to remove autocorrelation
between draws and every 10th draw in the stationary period is used for the subsequent analysis.
The estimation results are presented in Table 4. We observe that there are signicant dierences
in the  estimated on the complete and aggregate data, for both the HB and HB-LIV models.
1 is overestimated by 10% when the estimation is performed on aggregate data indicating that
aggregation bias exists when a HB model is used. The bias in 1 increases to 12.9% when a HB-LIV
12postk = vik or wdk depending on the context, where t represents the unit of time.
13We estimate the HB model on 25 dierent samples and the qualitative ndings remain the same.
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Table 4. Estimates of Parameters
HB HB-LIV
Parameters Complete Aggregate Complete Aggregate
:
0 -1.495(0.000) -1.459(0.001) -1.672(0.301) -1.612(0.189)
1 -0.793(0.085) -0.727(0.098) -0.642(0.120) -0.558(0.074)
V:
0 0.654(0.128) 0.753(0.170) 0.678(0.107) 0.689(0.192)
1 0.153(0.037) 0.155(0.038) 0.147(0.033) 0.162(0.042)
12 0.025(0.067) -0.085(0.076) 0.019(0.052) -0.090(0.076)
V:
 0.263(0.067) 0.389(0.082) 0.142(0.047) 0.196(0.065)
 1.733(0.238) 2.113(0.414)
 0.136(0.039) 0.176(0.052)
:
1 0.962 (0.083) 0.748 (0.091)
2 2.838 (0.029) 2.364 (0.037)
3 4.552 (0.012) 5.927 (0.045)
:
1 0.523 (0.255) 0.322 (0.181)
2 0.238 (0.173) 0.193 (0.127)
Instrument Variable:
post 1 0.885(0.096) 0.766(0.127)
Note that the values reported for parameters V; and  in the complete data case are means of the daily
estimates.
model is used. This results strongly indicates that aggregation bias is signicant in the context
of SSA. This nding is of concern as the extant literature on SSA (Agarwal et al., 2011; Ghose
and Yang, 2009; Yang and Ghose, 2010) is silent about this issue and only very recently, Rutz and
Trusov (2011) acknowledge its existence and account for it in their model. Rutz and Trusov (2011)
signicantly advance the SSA literature by proposing a novel methodology to address endogene-
ity which also addresses aggregation to some extent. However, as demonstrated in Table 4, the
aggregation bias in not completely eliminated, which points to the value of complete information.
Aggregate data is prone to two primary disadvantages { (i) it does not capture intra-day varia-
tions, and (ii) it is dicult to identify temporal patterns due to the limited amount of data (one
observation per day). When the estimation is performed on complete data, these variations can
be explicitly captured and accurately estimated underscoring the important of richer data in SSA.
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Our ndings demonstrate that this bias in non-trivial in practice and future research in SSA should
be informed about the pitfalls of aggregate data. In conjunction with prior literature, we also
observe a statistically signicant dierence in the estimates from the HB and the HB-LIV model,
conrming the need to control for endogeneity of ad position in sponsored search. Aggregation bias
acts in addition to the bias due to endogeneity, and it is just as important to correct.
We use the dierences between the estimates from summary and complete data for a random
sample of 5000 exact-match keywords to compute the empirical distribution of the error (" =
^s  ^c) due to aggregation. This empirical distribution is used in Section 5 to quantify the impact
of aggregation bias on search engine and advertiser revenues.
5 Managerial Implications
In the previous section, we show the existence of aggregation bias using the HB and HB-LIV models.
In this section, we discuss the managerial implications of the bias. The analysis presented in Section
3.2 provides evidence that aggregation bias can lead to a decrease in the search engine and possibly
an advertiser's revenue. Here, we extend the analysis to characterize the loss, exploiting the large
dataset available to us. Suppose m is the expected revenue per-click, then the advertiser's prot
per-impression is given by
 = CTR(CPC) fm  CPCg: (16)
It is easy to see the trade-o between bidding high to get more clicks (CTR increases with CPC) and
bidding low to earn greater prot per click. The optimal bids can be computed by substituting the
expression for CTR (as a function of advertisers CPC) into the prot function. Unfortunately, our
data do not contain bidding information (CPC), and as a result, we use estimates commonly found
in the extant literature to illustrate the magnitude of the loss. We assume that the relationship
between position and CPC is given by pos = e2(1 CPC) (Ghose and Yang, 2009) and the CTR
for the average keyword is a logit with ^c = ( 1:672; 0:642)0 (Table 4). The optimal bid can be
derived by substituting these relationships in Equation (16).When the advertiser uses aggregate
data, his estimate of  is given by ^s = ^c + ", where " is the estimation error computed in the
previous section. We sample ^s from this empirical distribution, and for each ^s, compute the
optimal bid that maximizes the advertiser's prot in Equation (16). The bids computed using ^c
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are greater than almost all the bids computed using samples of ^s, which supports our earlier claim
that aggregation bias results in an advertiser placing a lower-than-optimal bid.
Next, we use the computed CPCs to estimate the eect of aggregation bias on the advertiser's
and search-engine's revenues. Figure 2 shows the % loss suered by the advertiser due to aggregation
bias. There is a great deal of variation in this loss as the valuation changes. The impact of
aggregation bias is more pronounced when the advertiser's valuation for the click is low. In this
situation, he bids lower and even small deviations from the optimal bid can lead to signicant
changes in the position leading to signicantly lower payos. On the other hand, when the valuation
is high, the bid is correspondingly higher and deviations from the optimal bid have little impact
on position, and hence the loss is relatively smaller.
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Figure 2. Loss in revenues caused due to Aggregation bias.
The eect of aggregation is considerably higher for a search engine. On average, it loses more
that 11% of its payments from the advertiser as a result of aggregation bias. Lower bids, as a
consequence of aggregation bias, negatively impact search engine revenues in two ways { Firstly,
lower bids imply that the search engine generates lesser revenue per-click. Secondly, the ad appears
at a lower position due to the lower bid, which in turn leads to fewer clicks. The advertiser pays
the search engine for fewer clicks and pays less for each click. In this example, we estimate that
the search engine loses 1.4¢ for every impression of the representative ad.
In the preceding, analysis we consider how payments from one advertiser to the search engine
are aected due to aggregation bias. Naturally, the dynamics are more complicated when we try
to quantify the eect that the bias has on payments by all advertisers and the overall protability
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of the search engine. For example, when an advertiser bids sub-optimally and moves to a lower
position, another advertiser moves up to occupy the vacant position. Though the search engine
loses revenue from the advertiser that moves down, it earns more from the advertiser that moves
up, reducing the overall loss suered by the search engine. It is dicult to accurately estimate this
loss as we do not have data from multiple advertisers. Therefore, we leave this as direction for
future research.
6 Suggested Cures
In the previous discussion, we outlined the problem of aggregation bias and some of its implications.
As mentioned earlier, aggregation bias arises due to inadequate data. It might be infeasible for
search engines to store and report impression level data due to the size of such datasets and
potential privacy concerns. However, a search engine can provide dierent data to reduce the
eect of aggregation. Kendall and Stuart (1977) show that information about a few moments of a
distribution can be used to create a good approximation of the distribution. Accordingly, we explore
various summary statistics and measure the improvements they oer over the standard aggregate
data provided by search engines. We also consider a few modeling approaches, which explicitly
account for the variation in position and estimate the improvements oered by them.14 We rst
outline these approaches and subsequently draw comparisons between them. These approaches are
compared in two ways { (i) using the large representative search engine data available to us, and
(ii) an extensive evaluation using simulated data.
6.1 Proposed Summarization Techniques
Here, we present a few approaches that might be able to address the problem of aggregation bias.
6.1.1 Sample Mean
Dierent Ways of Aggregation
An important reason for bias is the non-linearity of the position-CTR curve. As a result, linear
aggregation of the position does not yield the correct underlying response parameters. Christen
14We thank the Associate Editor and the anonymous reviewers for recommending this extension.
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et al. (1997) and Danaher et al. (2008) show that when the response is multiplicative, i.e. of the
form x11 x
2
2 : : :, where xi are marketing mix variables, an aggregate model should use geometric
means to correctly estimate the coecients. Unfortunately, there is no analytical analog of this
result when the underlying model is logit. We use both the geometric and harmonic means and
empirically compare which method of aggregation works better in SSA. As the position-CTR curve
is convex in nature, both these aggregation methods might perform better than linear aggregation.
Modeling Position Variation using a Poisson
We also consider a model where Vi is drawn from a Poisson distribution with mean equal to the
daily (arithmetic) mean u. The log-likelihood of observing the data in this case is given by
LL(jdata; ) /
KX
k=1
DX
d=1
cdk log
( 1X
i=0
P (Vidk = v)pidk
)
+(ndk cdk) log
(
1 
1X
i=0
P (Vidk = v)pidk
)
;
(17)
where  is a K  D matrix, and every column of  contains the scale parameter of the Poisson
distribution for every day. The position of every impression Vidk for keyword k on the d
th day is
drawn from a Poisson distribution with kd = ukd and the probability P (Vidk = v) = 
v
dke
dk=v!.
Pooling Positions Across Days
In the previous approach, we try to model the data generating process (DGP) for position. Here,
we extend this analysis to model the data generating process by pooling data across multiple days.
Let's assume that the E[Vi] =  and V ar(Vi) = 2V .15 Using law of large numbers, it is easy to
show that the mean daily position, U  N(; 2v=n), where n is the number of impressions on day
d. To estimate , we follow a two-step process. In the rst step, we estimate  and 2V for each
keyword by maximizing the following likelihood,
LL(; 2V jdata) /
DY
d=1


ud   
2V =nd

;
where (:) represents the p.d.f. of the standard normal distribution. In the second step, we
approximate Vi by a normal distribution such that P (Vidk = v) = 

v k
2V k

  

v 1 k
2V k

, where
15We drop the day and keyword subscripts for simplicity.
23
(:) represents the c.d.f. of a standard normal distribution. Substituting this p.d.f. in Equation
(17) gives us the overall log-likelihood. Note that this approach relies on the implicit assumption
that FV (:) does not change over time.
6.1.2 Higher Order Statistics
If a search engine provides higher order moments in addition to the mean, the aggregation bias
may be reduced signicantly. We discuss three approaches with increasing data requirements.
Mean and Variance
When the mean (dk) and variance (
2
dk) of position are provided, we assume that the position
has a negative binomial distribution (NBD) with probability of success pdk and (real) number of
trails rdk. The NBD makes intuitive sense as the success of probability pdk of an NBD, can can
be thought of as the probability of a competing advertiser placing a higher bid. The log-likelihood
function is similar to Equation (17), but the distribution of ad position in this model is given by
P (Vidk = v) =
0B@ v + rdk   1
v
1CA (1  pdk)rdkpvdk;
where pdk = 1  dk
2dk
and rdk =
2dk
2dk   dk
:
Empirical Distribution
In the preceding approaches, the variation in position is modeled in a parametric manner due to
the limitation in the numbers of moments reported. A search engine can provide further moments,
e.g. skewness and kurtosis, which might help the research model the randomness in position more
accurately. For the sake of brevity, we adopt the extreme case and assume that the search engine
provides the empirical distribution of the ad position as shown in Table 5, in addition to the daily
summary. In this case, the variation in position can be modeled non-parametrically. The log-
likelihood is given by Equation (17), where P (Vidk = v) is provided by the empirical distribution,
e.g. P (Vidk = 5) = 0:29. As pointed out earlier, this data can also be independently collected by
an advertiser by periodically crawling ads from a search engine.
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Table 5. Empirical distribution of ad position
position frequency P (V = v)
2 20 0.13
3 10 0.07
4 50 0.32
5 45 0.29
6 30 0.19
Position-Level Summary
The complete dataset entirely eliminates aggregation bias, but it might be dicult for search engines
to provide this data due to privacy or technical concerns. Instead, the search engine can provide
a position-level summary, which is sucient statistics for the logit model as we show below. The
position-level summary reports the keyword performance measures for every position (where the
ad appeared) separately. It is easy to show that Equation (8) can be simplied to
LL(jcomplete data) /
KX
k=1
DX
d=1
1X
v=1
cvdk log pvdk + (nvdk   cvdk) log(1  pvdk); (18)
where nvdk and cvdk are the number of impressions and clicks on the k
th ad at position v on the dth
day, respectively. Since Equation (18) is identical to the likelihood function of the position-level
data, a position-level summary is sucient statistic to correctly estimate the parameters of the
model.
6.2 Application to Search Engine Data
We apply the summarization and modeling techniques presented earlier to the search engine data
available to us. Since the data used in Section 4 are quite extensive and representative of typical
data in SSA, the results presented here aim to provide real world validation for the suggested
summarization techniques. The results demonstrating the performance of these techniques vis-
a-vis the search engine data are presented in Table 6. The comparisons between the dierent
summarization techniques are performed using the mean average percentage error (MAPE) in the
estimates of 0 and 1, measured as j^0c  ^0sj=^0c and j^1c  ^1sj=^1c, respectively. Note that the
HB-LIV model is used for this analysis.
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Table 6. Comparative performance of various data summarization approaches on search engine data.
Method Data Requirement MAPE("0) MAPE("1)
Dierent Ways of Aggregation
Arithmetic Mean O(X) 53.4% 28.9%
Geometric Mean O(X) 42.1% 17.5%
Harmonic Mean O(X) 40.3% 10.2%
Poisson Model O(X) 43.3% 22.8%
Pooling Data Across Days O(X) 21.8% 10.8%
Mean and Variance O(2X) 15.2% 7.8%
Empirical Distribution O(NX) 9.8% 4.2%
Position-level Summary o(NX) 0% 0%
Firstly, we observe that both geometric and harmonic means perform better than the arithmetic
mean. This reduction in bias is due to the convexity of both these aggregation techniques, which
match the convexity of the position CTR curve. We also observe that the harmonic mean performs
better than the geometric mean. This implies that if a search engine wants to provide only the mean
position in the campaign reports, it should provide the harmonic mean of the position. This result
also suggests that researchers who aggregate sponsored search data at a weekly or a monthly level
for lack of sucient data or computational reasons should use the harmonic mean for aggregation.
Secondly, we observe that modeling techniques have mixed performance. Modeling the variation in
position as a Poisson random variable does not work well as shown in Table 6. This approach does
not perform very well because the ad position does not follow a Poisson distribution, a hypothesis
we conrm using the Neyman-Scott test. However, pooling data across days leads to signicant
decrease in the bias, but the eect is heterogeneous across keywords. This approach works best
when the distribution of the ad position does not change across days, e.g. when the bids are held
constant in the observation period. If the bids change, then the performance of this technique
drops considerably. Thirdly, we observe that richer data that provide higher order moments lead
to signicant improvement in the parameter estimation. From Table 6, we observe that using
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both the mean and the variance to model the variation in the ad position signicantly improves
the estimates. Not only do we observe a reduction in the aggregation bias but there is also a
considerable decrease in the error in ^0s. On average, there is more than 70% reduction in the
estimation error associated with 0 and 1. Using the empirical distribution marginally improves
the estimation performance. This summarization technique performs better than all the preceding
techniques and the MAPE is considerably lower for 0 and 1. When the position-level summary is
used, the aggregation bias is completely eliminated. However, this technique requires substantially
more data as compared to the other techniques.
6.3 Application to Simulated Data
In order to perform better characterization of these techniques and ascertain their performance
under dierent conditions, we turn to simulated data.16
6.3.1 A Model of Sponsored Search Auctions
We model a generalized second price auction to determine the position of the ad across dierent
impressions. We adopt the approach presented by Abhishek and Hosanagar (2013) and assume
that the competing advertisers draw their bids from a Weibull distribution which is given by
F (x; ; c) = 1  exp

 
x
c
 
;
where  is the shape parameter and c is the scale parameter. A Weibull distribution is quite exible
and has been shown to capture the bid distribution better than other commonly used distributions
(Abhishek and Hosanagar, 2013). Variation in  can give rise to dierent types of competing bid
distributions, whereas c changes the magnitude of the bids. Low values of  lead to heterogeneous
bids, whereas higher values of  lead to relatively homogeneous bids. These competing bids are
stochastically changed during the course of the day, leading to intra-day variation in position.17
The probability that the bids are changed before an impression is denoted by . Intuitively, the
intra-day variation in position increases in . In Section 3, we had assumed that the distribution
of the ad position remains constant during the period of observation for analytical tractability.
16We thank the Associate Editor and the anonymous reviewers for suggesting this extension.
17The ndings are qualitatively similar for dierent values of  .
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Here, we relax this assumption such that the advertiser can change his bid several times during the
observation period (but not within a day), changing FV (:). To model consumer choice, a logit data
generating process is used and the inputs to the simulation are the coecients of the logit model
(0; 1) and . The consumer's decision to click on the ad (of the focal advertiser) conditional on its
position is simulated for each query using the random utility model specied in Equation (2). The
complete data record the position and the binary click decision for every impression. In addition,
the daily total number of impressions, clicks and the mean position for the ad are computed and
recorded in the aggregate data. 100 dierent runs are generated for every tuple 0; 1 and , where
0 2 [ 2; 1]; 1 2 [ 1; 0:25] and  2 [0; 1].
For the sake of brevity, the exact characterization of the bias is presented in the Online Ap-
pendix. There are three main insights from this analysis { (i) the bias (and the intra-day variation)
increases with  as shown earlier in Proposition 2, (ii) when FV (:) is not constant during the
simulation period, the bias increases super-linearly in j1j, and (iii) the error in the estimate of
intercept term increases in j1j and .18 We now apply the techniques proposed in Section 6.1 on
the simulated data to obtain a greater understanding of their eectiveness.
6.3.2 Analysis on Simulated Data
Similar to Section 6.2, we use MAPE to compare the various techniques, but instead of measuring
the error with respect to ^c, we use the simulation parameter .
19 We begin by presenting the over-
all performance of the aforementioned techniques and subsequently discuss how their performance
varies across dierent values of .
The comparisons between these methodologies are presented in Table 7. We continue to observe
that the harmonic mean performs considerably well as compared to the arithmetic and geometric
means. The magnitude of the errors reported in Table 7 is lower in comparison to the errors
reported in Table 6. This is due to the fact that we include a larger range of 0 and 1 in our
simulation analysis than what is observed in practice. Pooling data across days, to derive the
underlying distribution of position, reduces the bias signicantly. In the absence of adequate data,
this approach can be used by researchers and academics to reduce aggregation bias. This approach
18These results are presented in Tables 1 and 2 in the Online Appendix.
19There is no statistical dierence between  and ^c.
28
Table 7. Comparative performance of various data summarization approaches on simulated data.
Method MAPE("0) MAPE("1)
Dierent ways of aggregation
Arithmetic mean 10.3% 20.1%
Geometric mean 8.1% 10.6%
Harmonic mean 4.4% 5.8%
Poisson model 8.1% 9.7%
Pooling data across days
Not accounting for bid changes 6.2% 7.7%
Accounting for bid changes 3.4% 4.2%
Mean and Variance 2.8% 3.6%
Empirical Distribution 2.1% 2.5%
Position-level Summary 0% 0%
is more eective when changes in the position distribution (e.g. due to bid changes) are explicitly
accounted for in the estimation. If there are signicant dierences in the position distribution
across days, then this approach might further increase the bias.
Daily summaries that report more data, e.g. the daily mean and variance, decrease the esti-
mation error to a signicant extent in the simulations. The bias when both the daily mean and
variance are reported is quite similar to the bias when data is pooled across days. However, it
should be kept in mind that pooling data across days is eective only when changes in FV (:) are
explicitly accounted for, which can be challenging in a real-world setting. Providing the daily em-
pirical distribution of position further decreases the estimation error, but the incremental benet
is small. Not surprisingly, the position-level summary has no bias.
Figure 3 demonstrates the bias for dierent techniques. Clearly, we observe that the magnitude
of the bias increases non-linearly for all techniques as 1 increases. Furthermore, we observe that
using the empirical distribution out performs all the other techniques, while using the harmonic
mean leads to the least amount of bias when only the daily means are reported.
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Figure 3. Magnitude of the bias for dierent values of 1 when 0 = 2:0 and  = 0:5.
6.4 Summary of Results
The empirical analysis presented here has two distinct themes. The rst theme suggests that
provisioning of better data by a search engine can lead to signicant reduction in the aggregation
bias. As we show in the preceding sections, it is incentive compatible for the search engine to provide
better data to advertisers. The appropriate dataset should be determined as a trade-o between
the loss due to aggregation and the costs associated with providing richer data to advertisers. If a
search engine can provide only daily means, it should report the harmonic mean. On the hand, if a
search engine is at a liberty to provide any data, it should provide the position-level summary. The
second theme points to steps that can be taken by an advertiser or a researcher to explicitly account
for the variation in position using modeling techniques (e.g. pooling data across days) or collecting
addition information (e.g. by crawling the search engine to generate the empirical distribution). A
unilateral reduction in the aggregation bias can prove to be protable for an advertiser as shown
in Corollary 1.
7 Conclusions
Search engine advertising is fast emerging as an important and popular medium of advertising for
several rms. The medium oers rich data for advertisers on consumer click and conversion behav-
ior. As a result, there has been considerable interest in analyzing SSA data among practitioners and
researchers. Several models have been proposed to study consumer behavior and inform advertiser
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strategies.
This paper makes three main contributions. First, we demonstrate the existence of aggregation
bias and its eect on the equilibrium of the SSA auction. We show that equilibrium bids are lower
when advertisers use aggregate data. As a result the search engine's revenues are always lower due
to the bias. Second, we use a large search engine dataset and quantify the magnitude of the bias
and measure its economic impact. Third, we present various summarization techniques that can
be used by search engines to provide better datasets to advertisers.
These ndings have important managerial and economic implications. Advertisers commonly
use aggregate data provided by search engines to guide their bidding strategies. Our results suggest
that advertisers might not be bidding optimally in these auctions because they overestimate the
clicks obtainable at a given position. This not only impacts the advertisers negatively, but also
leads to a reduction in the revenue of the advertiser. Given the size of the SSA industry, these losses
can translate into several million dollars of lost revenues for the search engines. Our study points
out that the current format of the data provided to advertisers is not adequate, and search engines
should take steps to address this problem. We recognize that it might be infeasible for search
engines to store and report impression level data due to the size of such datasets and potential
privacy concerns. However, these constraints do not imply that it is infeasible to provide adequate
data to advertisers. We provide guidelines to search engines about the nature of datasets that can
be provided to researchers and quantify the reduction in the bias that each of these techniques
oer.
We also nd that, as a result of aggregation bias, consumer response to other ad attributes, such
as ad text or branding, may also have been incorrectly estimated. Thus advertisers must be cautious
in applying the biased estimates to guide key managerial decisions such as ad design and keyword
selection. In the absence of adequate data from search engines, advertisers and researchers must
take into account the variation in ad position within a day. This can be determined by examining if
multiple queries are matched to a single keyword (match type is broad) and if bids of competitors
change considerably within a given day. If the ad position for a keyword is somewhat stable across
impressions within a day, the bias is likely to be low and existing random utility models can be
applied on aggregate data.
Our study focuses mainly on demonstrating the existence and direction of aggregation bias in
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the coecient of position and identifying some economic consequences of this bias. An interesting
and related question is how aggregation aects ad attributes like wordographics, presence of brand
information, ad creative etc. and whether their coecients also suer from aggregation bias. In
this paper, the eect of ad attributes is subsumed in the intercept term as we do not have data
on ad attributes. A richer dataset that contains ad characteristics might help in a more extensive
analysis of this issue. Another direction for future research is building models that endogenize
the variation in position. The variation in position can be modeled using probabilistic models or
structural methods. In ongoing work, we are developing a model that explicitly accounts for the
intra-day variation in position and would therefore not suer from aggregation bias.
SSA presents an exciting opportunity to understand consumer behavior and drivers of rms'
advertising strategy. Through this paper we hope to inform the practitioners about the inadequacies
of the data standards commonly used in SSA so that they can take steps to address these problems.
We also identify issues with some common modeling techniques in SSA so that subsequent research
in this emerging area is informed about these issues.
Appendix: Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Lemma 1
We use the following result from Muller and Stoyan (2002, page 27) to prove this result. Let
V1; :::; Vn be iid random variables and f1; :::; fn measurable real functions. Dene the function f by
f(v) =
1
n
nX
i=1
fi(v):
Then,
nX
i=1
f(Vi) cx
nX
i=1
fi(Vi):
Using this result we now prove that Wn cx V , where Wn is the average position when there are
exactly n impressions on the day. Let fi(v) = v=(n  1) for all i = 1; : : : ; n  1 and fn(v)  0.
f(v) =
1
n
n 1X
i=1
v=(n  1) = v
n
:
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Since
nX
i=1
f(Vi) =
1
n
nX
i=1
Vi and
nX
i=1
fi(Vi) =
1
n  1
n 1X
i=1
Vi ) 1
n
nX
i=1
Vi cx 1
n  1
n 1X
i=1
Vi:
Proceeding in a recursive manner
1
n  1
n 1X
i=1
Vi cx 1
n  2
n 2X
i=1
Vi;
: : :
V1 + V2
2
cx V:
)Wn = 1
n
nX
i=1
Vi cx 1
n  1
n 1X
i=1
Vi cx : : : cx V1 + V2
2
cx V
Let g be any convex function
As E[g(W )] =
1X
i=1
g(Wn)P (n);) E [E[g(W )]] = E
" 1X
i=1
g(Wn)P (n)
#
;
) E [E[g(W )]] =
1X
i=1
E [g(Wn)]P (n) 
1X
i=1
E [g(V )]P (n) = E [g(V )]
1X
i=1
P (n) = E [g(V )] ;
as P (n) is a probability measure. Therefore W cx V .
Proof of Proposition 1
Let Yi denote an indicator variable that equals 1 if the i
th impression resulted in a click and zero oth-
erwise. We assume that the clicks are independent of each other and hence Yis are independent.The
log likelihood of observing the dataset with a total of I ad impressions is given by
LL(jcomplete data) =
IX
i=1
yi log pi + (1  yi) log(1  pi): (19)
The rst order condition (F.O.C) for Equation (19) is as follows
@LL
@
=
IX
i=1
fyi(1  pi)  (1  yi)pig x0i = 0;
=
IX
i=1
fyi   pig x0i = 0:
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where xi = (1 vi)
0. Since we know that LL(jdata) is a convex function in  (Hayashi, 2000) this
F:O:C gives us the following two equations
C =
IX
i=1
pi; (20)
IX
i=1
yivi =
IX
i=1
vipi: (21)
Dividing Equation (20) by I we get
obsctr =
C
I
=
1
I
IX
i=1
pi: (22)
If the number of impressions on day d is nd and the number of clicks is cd. The log-likelihood
of observing the aggregate data for D days is given by
LL(jaggregate data) =
DX
d=1
cd log pd + (nd   cd) log(1  pd) (23)
Evaluating the rst order condition for Equation (23)
@LL
@
=
DX
d=1
fcd(1  pd)  (nd   cd)pdg x0d = 0;
=
DX
d=1
fcd   ndpdg x0d = 0;
where xd = (1 wd)
0, which in turn gives us
DX
d=1
cd = C =
DX
d=1
ndpd; (24)
DX
d=1
wdcd =
DX
d=1
ndwdpd: (25)
Dividing Equation (24) by I we get
obsctr =
C
I
=
DX
d=1
ndpd
I
: (26)
34
Note that the obsctr is the came in both cases.
Assuming I is large we can apply Chevychev's law of large numbers to rewrite Equation (22) as
obsctr = E
"
e^0;c+^1;cV
1 + e^0;c+^1;cV
#
: (27)
If we have a large enough observation period, Equation (26) can be simplied as
obsctr =
DX
d=1
nde
^0;s+^1;swn
I(1 + e^0;s+^1;swn)
= E
"
e^0;s+^1;sW
1 + e^0;s+^1;sW
#
:
As the observed ctr, obsctr is same in both the cases,
E
"
e^0;c+^1;cV
1 + e^0;c+^1;cV
#
= E
"
e^0;s+^1;sW
1 + e^0;s+^1;sW
#
: (28)
As the convex ordering in Lemma 1 holds and logit is a convex in position for 0 < 0 (which is a
reasonable assumption in SSA as the CTR on the topmost position is less that 0.2 in all cases), it
follows from the denition of convex ordering that
E
"
e^0;c+^1;cV
1 + e^0;c+^1;cV
#
 E
"
e^0;s+^1;sW
1 + e^0;s+^1;sW
#
; (29)
if ^c = ^s. The equality holds only when FV (:) = FW (:) i.e. which hold only under few special
cases (e.g. when there is exactly one impression every day or there is no intra-day variation in
position). Since Equation (28) and Equation (29) cannot simultaneously be true and Equation
(28) always holds we prove by contradiction that ^c 6= ^s.
Proof of Propositions 2 (i) and (ii)
i) Since we know that
E
"
e^0;c+^1;cV
1 + e^0;c+^1;cV
#
= E
"
e^0;s+^1;sW
1 + e^0;s+^1;sW
#
;
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and by denition of convex order
E
"
e^0;c+^1;cV
1 + e^0;c+^1;cV
#
 E
"
e^0;c+^1;cW
1 + e^0;c+^1;cW
#
;
we can say that
E
"
e^0;s+^1;sW
1 + e^0;s+^1;sW
#
 E
"
e^0;c+^1;cW
1 + e^0;c+^1;cW
#
:
As this result hold for any distribution ofW , this relation should hold pointwise for the two function.
) e
^0;s+^1;sx
1 + e^0;s+^1;sx
 e
^0;c+^1;cx
1 + e^0;c+^1;cx
ii) The preceding relationship implies that
e^0;s+^1;sx  e^0;c+^1;cx 8x  0
) ^1;s > ^1;c
Proof of Propositions 2 (iii)
If the true model is U = 0k + 1kVi + , but we use the aggregate data for estimation, then we
have
U = 0 + 1(Wd + Zi) + ;
= 0 + 1Wd + 1Zi + :
The disturbance term in this case is 1Zi+ . Assuming that 1Zi+  is approximately logistically
distributed, ^1;s ! 1=
p
V ar(1Zi) + 1, where  = 1 for the purpose of identication. The
variance V ar(1Zi) can be computed in the following manner.
V ar(Zi) = V ar(Vi  Wd);
= V ar(Vi) + V ar(Wd)  2Cov(Vi; Wd);
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= 2V +

2V + 
2
V
	
E

1
N

+ 22V E

1
N

;
= 2V +

32V + 
2
V
	
E

1
N

:
Hence,
^1;s ! 1q
21

2V + (3
2
V + 
2)
	
+ 1
;
where  = E[1=N ].
Proof of Proposition 3
(i) We assume that advertiser j moves to position j
0
if he uses aggregate data. Since j
0
ends up
higher than j in equilibrium, b
0
j(sj ; j
0
; h) < bj0(sj0 ; j
0; h) or
1
j0 1
((j0 1   j0 )sj0 + j0 bj0+1) >
1

0
j0 1
((
0
j
0 1   
0
j
0 )sj + 
0
j
0 bj0+1); (30)
which also implies that his bid in the equilibrium decreases, i.e. b
0
j < bj0 . In addition, as b
0
j is lower
than bj , j
0  j. The bids for all the advertisers in this case are as follows:
b
0
i =
1
i 1
 
KX
k=i
(k   k+1)sk
!
for i > j
0
;
b
0
j =
1

0
j0 1
0@(0
j
0 1   
0
j
0 )sj +

0
j
0
j0
j
0
+1X
k=i
(k   k+1)sk
1A ;
b
0
i =
1

0
i 2
0@ j0X
k=i
(i 2   i 1)si + j0+1b
0
j
1A for j0  i > j;
b
0
i =
1

0
i 1
 
j 1X
k=i
(i 1   i)si + j 1b0j+1
!
for i < j:
As h do not change for advertisers below j
0
, therefore their bids remain the same. It is easy to see
that advertisers j + 1 to j
0
end up bidding higher, i.e. b
0
i > bi for j < i  j
0
though they moves up
by 1 position.
We now show that the bid associated with every position  j0 is lower than when complete
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data is used. Lets consider the bid b
0
j0 , placed by advertiser j
0
who occupies position j
0   1. We
start o by showing that b
0
j0 < bj
0 1.
b
0
j0   bj0 1 =
1
j0 2
((j0 2   j0 1) (sj0   sj0 1)| {z }
<0 by construction
+j0 1 (b
0
j   bj0 )| {z }
<0 by assumption
) < 0:
So the bid for position j
0   1 is lower than the bid in the complete case. Proceeding in a similar
manner it is easy to show that bids for all positions above j
0   1 will also be lower. This implies
that b
0
i < bi for i < j (these ads do not change position). To summarize { b
0
j < bj , b
0
i < bi for i < j,
b
0
i > bi for j < i  j
0
and b
0
i = bi for i > j
0
.
(ii) As all the bids are either the same or lower in this case, search-engine revenue is lower (A2S <
CS ). The payo of advertiser j is lower as any deviation from the optimal bidding policy results in
a strictly lower payo. Advertisers j
0
+1 onwards receive the same payo and all other advertisers
are better o due to suboptimal bid by advertiser j. Starting o with advertiser j
0
,
A2
j0  Cj0 = (j0 1   j0 )sj0   j0 1b
0
j + j0 b
0
j0+1
= (j0 1   j0 )sj0 + j0 bj0+1  
j0 1

0
j
0 1
((
0
j0 1   
0
j0 )sj + 
0
j0 bj0+1)
> 0 (by Equation 30)
Similarly, using induction we can show that A2i > 
C
i for advertiser i, s.t. j < i  j
0
. For i < j,
the revenues remain the same but the payment to the search engines is lower, hence their payo
are higher for these advertisers too (A2i > 
C
i , i < j).
Proof of Proposition 4
(i) If all advertisers use the same incorrect estimate of i, the optimal bidding policy is the one
proposed by Edelman et al. (2007). They just use 
0
i instead of i to compute the optimal bids.
We can show by induction that b
0
j  bj for all advertisers.
Step 0: Let b
0
K+1 = bK+1 = 0.
Step 1: b
0
K = sK

1  
0
K

0
K 1

< sK

1  KK 1

= bK .
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Assuming b
0
j+1 < bj+1,
Step j:
b
0
j = sj
 
1  
0
j

0
j 1
!
+

0
j

0
j 1
b
0
j+1
< sj
 
1  
0
j

0
j 1
!
+

0
j

0
j 1
bj+1
< sj

1  j
j 1

+
j
j 1
bj+1
< bj :
Hence, b
0
j < bj 8j  K.
(ii) Since all advertisers occupy the same position as they did earlier and pay less, search engine
prots are lower ( A1S < 
C
S ). The advertisers' payo in the case are higher: 
A1
i = i(si b
0
i+1) >
i(si   bi+1) = Ci from Proposition 5 (i).
Proof of Proposition 5
Lets assume that Advertiser j uses aggregate data and appears at a position j
0
. Let the equilibrium
bids be denoted by b
0
1; : : : ; b
0
K ; 0. In the equilibrium, j0 (sj   bj0 ) > i(sj   bi+1) 8 i 6= j
0
. Now
suppose that Advertiser j does not have access to aggregate data and overestimates i=i 1. As
a result, he bids lower and moves to position j
00  j0 . Following the argument in the Proof of
Proposition 4, the bids for all positions i, i  j00 decrease and all other advertisers are better o.
As the bids are (weakly) lower, the search-engine revenue is lower. The payo to Advertiser j is
j00 (sj   bj00 ) < j0 (sj   bj0 ) as he found it optimal to bid for position j
0
when he could correctly
estimate the CTR. This implies that he is worse o using aggregate data.
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